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Update 
The cut-off point for this paper is May 1989. Since then the ICO quota has been 
suspended. This has led to a dramatic fall in the international price of coffee 
from US$ 2.00 to around US$ 0.80 per kg of robusta. The projections at the 
beginning of Section III of this paper are, therefore, outdated. 
However, improving the efficiency of the marketing system is even more 
important now. In order to still realize some exports earnings from coffee, 
Uganda must reduce marketing costs as far as possible in the short-run. 
In the long-run, structural adjustment policies should aim at diversifying 
exports and reducing the relative importance of coffee. But the most likely new 
exports are dried foods (maize, beans, groundnuts, soybean, millet, simsim) and 
fresh horticultural produce. These commodities are perishable and deteriorate 
far more rapidly than coffee. The marketing system, therefore, must be even 
more efficient to handle these new exports. 
Also to allow for a rapid reallocation of resources to new exports, producer 
prices must be renumerative, at least higher in real terms than what coffee 
farmers have been receiving. 
The shilling has been devalued from USh 200 to USh 470 per US$, partly to 
raise government revenue and to encourage diversification of exports. 
Without an improvement in producer prices and marketing efficiency, 
however, devaluation will not be sufficient to achieve the stated objectives of 
structural adjustment. The main conclusions of the paper, therefore, are still 
valid. 
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Abstract 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of structural adjustment 
policies on the supply conditions of coffee, Uganda's major export, which 
accounts for over 90% of foreign exchange earnings and about 50% of tax 
revenue. Because of a lack of quantitative data, it was impossible to compute the 
price elasticity of supply related to higher producer prices of coffee made 
possible by the structural adjustment policies, especially devaluation. Instead, 
qualitative information was gathered on own producer price of coffee, 
smuggling, efficiency of the marketing system, the opportunity cost of 
competing crops, and the prospects of introducing new technology/and farming 
systems. 
The qualitative evidence suggests that the supply of coffee is price inelastic: 
the lack of price response is due to adverse pricing policy that taxes the farmer 
excessively and the inefficiencies of the marketing system that cause delay in 
paying the same farmer. Given this conclusion, Uganda has to devalue by a very 
large percentage in order to effect an increase in coffee exports; she cannot 
afford to forego the required large reduction in export duty to increase the 
producer's price, if she were not to devalue. 
Whereas devaluation might be necessary to stimulate exports, by itself it is 
not sufficient: an optimal pricing policy administered through an efficient 
marketing system, taxation reform and exports diversification, all appear equally 
necessary components of a successful adjustment programme. Without these 
components, the potential benefits of devaluation are quickly eroded by inflation 
and further devaluation is increasingly resisted by government as the benefits 
dwindle. 
I. Introduction: Structural adjustment 
and the coffee sector 
The main instrument of structural adjustment has been a gradual depreciation of 
the exchange rate since June 1981. Depreciation was intended to improve the 
comparative advantage of producing exportables. Since coffee accounts for over 
90% of Uganda's foreign exchange earnings, this paper concentrates on the 
effects of exchange rate adjustments on coffee exports. 
Depreciation was intended to increase the price of coffee in local currency: 
part of this increase was to be passed on to the farmer in the form of a higher 
producer price to induce him to increase coffee output from the field, and to 
divert previously smuggled coffee into official export channels. The ultimate 
objective was to increase foreign exchange earnings, a major constraint on 
restructuring the economy. 
A related objective was to redistribute income in favour of the farmer by 
raising rural purchasing power as the price of coffee rose relative to the price of 
consumables. 
A third objective was to find a non-inflationary source of government 
revenue: as the price of coffee rose in local currency, government was to collect 
part of the increase in export duty and use it to reduce the proportion of the 
budgetary deficit financed from the banking system, which is inflationary. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the change in the supply conditions 
of coffee due to exchange rate adjustment and related policies, i.e. the extent to 
which the objectives stated above have been realized since 1981. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the methodology for 
estimating the price elasticity of coffee supply under Uganda's data 
shortcomings. Section III provides a qualitative analysis of the short-run and 
long-run determinants of coffee supply. Section IV investigates the policy 
options, exchange rate adjustment or tax reform, for raising the producer price 
of coffee in order to effect the desired change in export quantity. Section V 
discusses three other important considerations: the domestic resource cost of 
coffee as an index of comparative advantage; the Sebastian Edwards hypotheses 
on the problems of exchange rate policy in a single-export economy; and the 
current national crisis of crop finance. Section VI summarizes the findings. 
II. Methodology for estimating 
coffee-supply elasticities and 
Uganda's data limitations 
Since coffee is a perennial crop, the supply models assume that acreage under 
coffee-yielding trees is fixed, at least in the short-run, and might remain fixed 
even in the long-run if coffee is grown in densely populated areas where land is 
scarce (Maitha, 1974). 
The models concentrate on the determinants of changes in output per hectare 
or land productivity, to which variation in labour can be applied in the short-run; 
and technology improvement, purchased inputs and tree replanting can be 
applied in the long-run. The standard equation of the models takes the form: 
(1) log (Q/ X) t = ao + a1 log P1 -a2 log P2 - a3 log Z - 
(Q/X) = output per hectare 
a0 = the constant reflecting past historical influences and weather 
a1 = the own producer price elasticity of supply, the main target of 
exchange rate adjustment 
a2 = the price elasticity of the substitute crop competing with coffee for 
the same productive resources: this is negative, an increase in the 
price of the substitute crop reduces the supply of coffee 
Z - = stocks of the previous year's output, which vary with marketing 
efficiency, e.g. paying farmers cash on delivering the crop, and 
rapid stock turnover by the processing and marketing system 
a3 = the stock elasticity, which is negative since the build-up of stocks is 
a disincentive to increasing current production 
L/r = the land-rental ratio 
a4 = the elasticity with respect to the land-rental ratio, which is negative 
since an increase in the land-rental ratio reduces profitability.' 
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Uganda's data limitations 
The total production of coffee (Qt) per year in Uganda is unknown since there 
are no figures on production or area planted, the (X) variable. The last 
agricultural census was in 1965, and the next one is planned for 1991. The 
figures in Table A. 1 are extrapolations. 
The indicative figures from the Ministry of Agriculture in Table A.2 show 
that about 195,000 hectares are under robusta coffee, and 30,000 hectares under 
arabica. But as the notes to the table indicate, the figures are not very accurate. 
For production, the figures on yield (Q/X) are unknown. The data in Table 
A.3 are on marketed output purchased by the Coffee Marketing Board, which is 
influenced by changes in stocks and diversion from smuggling. 
Data on the real producer price Pi (equal to the nominal producer price, 
deflated by the Kampala cost of living index, low-income group) are reported in 
Table A.4 for each type of coffee. The figures for P2, the real producer price for 
bananas, the competing crop, are also similarly deflated and reported in Table 
(L) A.3, column (4). But data on are not available. 
Given the lack of data on the dependent variable, and on the third and fourth 
independent variables, it is not possible to estimate the price elasticity of supply 
for Uganda's coffee in any meaningful way.2 
Illustrative data from other countries 
Table 1 provides illustrative estimates of price elasticities of supply from 
neighbouring Kenya and Africa. The range of short-run elasticities is between 
0.12 and 0.70; whereas that of long-run elasticities is between 0.44 and 1.5. 
Taking these estimates as a guide, we shall assume that 0.10—2.00 covers the 
feasible range of price elasticities that would have been obtained had data been 
available in Uganda: we shall use the values within this range for policy analysis 
in Section IV, below. 
















Kenya 1946—1964 Maitha 1970 0.64' 1.33 
Kenya (estates) 1946—1 964 Maitha 1970 0.66* 1.38 
Kenya (small-holder) 1946—1964 Maitha 1970 0.64* 1.48 
Kenya 1946—1964 Ford 1971 - 1.07 
Kenya (estate) 1946—1964 Ford 1971 - 1.18 
Kenya (small-holder) 1946—1964 Ford 1971 - 1.15 
Atrica 1947—1963 devries 1975 0.12' 0.44 
Source: Bond, 1983. 
Ill. The determinants of 
supply response 
Before examining what makes coffee output respond to price changes, it is 
useful to determine first whether the pontential increase in output can be sold at 
remunerative international prices. 
Trends in international prices 
Table 2 shows the recent trends in the unit value of Uganda's coffee f.o.b. 
Mombasa, and the international prices for both coffee and competing export 
crops. 
Table 2 Trends in international prices of Uganda's exports (US$ per kg) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Co mpeting crops 
(4) (5) (6) 
Unit value Robusta Arabica Tea Cotton Maize 
index, coffee coffee coffee (medium 
staple) 
1980 100 3.54 3.44 2.90 2.07 0.17 
1981 61 2.27 2.19 2.02 1.85 0.18 
1982 65 2.44 2.29 1.95 1.61 0.16 
1983 77 2.72 2.97 2.32 1.85 0.15 
1984 87 3.04 3.17 3.46 1.78 0.15 









1.93 1.06 0,12 
1.88 1.43 0.111 
Nov. 1988 ' 2.00 2.95 
Sources: a. Republic of Uganda, Background to the Budget, 1988—1 989. 
b. Agricultural Secretariat, Bank of Uganda. The 1980 and 1985—1987 
figures are from the London market, the rest are from the source ri Note 
3. 
c. International Monetary Fund, Primary Commodities: Market 
Developments and Outlook (Commodity Division, Research Department, 
Washington D.C., May 1987). 
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Although the unit value index, column (1), has declined since 1980, compared to 
other exports (columns 4—.6), coffee still fetches the highest international price 
per kilogram (columns 2—3). 
Projections in this paper will be based on the assumption that the world price 
will stay around US$ 2.00 per kg. This is not far from the recent low price of 
US$ 1.9 per kg. At this price, coffee still compares favourably with the other 
exports. 
The market for coffee 
Assuming that Uganda resumes all aggressive marketing policy to regain her 5% 
share in the international quota market, which she held in the 1970s, and a'so to 
export to non-quota markets up to 30,360 kg. which she exported in 1972, the 
following export quantities have been projected as feasible, up to the maximum 
in the last row of Table 3. 














(%) (tons) (tons) (tons) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1987/88 4.1 142,680 18,000 160,680 
1988/89 4.2 149,640 18,900 168,540 
1989/90 4.5 159,300 19,860 179,160 
1990/91 4.7 169,200 20,880 190,080 
Maximum 5.0 174,000 30,360 204,360 
Source: Agricultural Policy Committee, Report on Producer Prices for Export Crops During 
1988/89 (June 1988), Kampala, Agricultural Secretanat, Bank of Uganda. 
Recent estimates by the Ministry of Agriculture, in metric tons, are: 
Robusta Arabica Total 
1989/90 179,262 25,911 205,253 
1990/91 206,190 29,890 236,253 
Most analysts regard these estimates as too optimistic, given the supply and 
marketing problems to be discussed. We, therefore, retained the conservative 
estimates extrapolated from the Agricultural Secretariat in Table 3. 
Compared to current exports of 148,200 tons in 1987, Uganda could increase 
her exports by 56,160 tons, which represents a 38% increase in export volume. 
At US$ 2 per kg the 56,160 tons would earn an extra US$ 112.32 million, which 
is a 35% increase in the value of exports over those of 1987. 
For the policy analysis below, we shall use 56,160 tons as the working figure 
for a feasible increase in exports. Given that this figure represents close to a 
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40% increase in export volume, and around 35% in exports earnings, it is 
important to examine critically the factors determining coffee supply since a 
realization of the 56,160 tons goal within five years could greatly alleviate 
Uganda's foreign exchange shortage. 
The determinants of coffee supply: Short-run factors 
In the short-run, 1—2 years when acreage is fixed, changes in exportable output 
from exchange rate adjustment depend upon several factors: own producer price, 
diversion from smuggling into official channels, efficiency of the marketing 
system, and the reallocation of labour from competing crops. 
(a) The own producer price (P1) 
Table 4 shows the current pricing structure, i.e. the share in the international 
price per kilogram of clean coffee by each claimant. When the absolute value of 
the coffee price is raised in domestic currency by depreciation, only a small part 
of the increase is passed on to the farmer, i.e. no more than 37%. 
Table 4 Pricing structure of coffee 
Claimant Share in the world price of 1 kg. 
clean robusta coffee (percent) 
Farmer's share 
1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 
37.0 36.0 28.51 
Primary society collection costs 0.6 0.6 
Processing costs 6.7 8.4 
Export and marketing costs 12.7 10.8 
Government export duty 43.0 44.2 
100.0 100.0 
Source: Agricultural Secretariat, Bank of Uganda. 
Notes: (a) The nominal producer price of USh 60 per kg of robusta kiboko was set when 
the exchange rate was USh 150 per US$. When the shilling was devalued 
further to Sh165 and 5h200, the price per kilogram of coffee was not changed 
from Sh60. These two devaluations eroded the farmer's share to 28.5 percent 
per kg. of clean robusta. 
(b) When the international price of coffee falls, the processing and marketing co- 
operatives and the CMB are paid the same amont of Uganda shs. The 
government reduces its share. This neither benefits the farmer nor the 
government, It simply encourages inefficiency of the marketing system. (See 
also section (c) below). 
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The proportion passed on in nominal terms appears large, as columns (1) and 
(2) of Table A.5 in Appendix A suggest; but in real terms the proportions are 
small as they are eroded by the rapid rate of inflation, as illustrated in Table A. 
4. In fact, real producer prices have not risen systematically despite repeated 
devaluations. 
Producer prices are adjusted infrequently, at most twice a year. The farmer, 
however, purchases his requirements from the open market where prices adjust 
continuously with the rate of inflation, reducing his purchasing power, as 
illustrated in Table 5. This erosion of purchasing power, redistributes income 
against the farmer, contrary to the stated objectives of the structural adjustment 
programmes. 
Table 5 Change in farmers' purchasing power of a basket of commodities from 
a kilogram of robusta kiboko coffee 
Commodities 1972 1981 May 1987 Oct. 1987 Jan. 1988 May 1988 
Salt (kg) 1.21 0.28 0.96 0.60 0.80 0.20 
Sugar (kg) 0.59 0.09 0.40 0.24 0.15 0.07 
Soap (bar) 0.24 0.04 0.24 0.24 0.48 0.03 
Paraffin (litre) 1.98 0.65 1.20 0.80 1.45 0.14 
Cloth (metre) 0.44 0.11 0.24 0.03 0.05 0.03 
Source: Agricultural Policy Committee, Report on producer prices for export crops during 1988/89. 
Kampala, Agricultural Secretariat, Bank of Uganda. 
Note: There has been no regaining of the 1972 terms of trade. Improvements in the purchasing 
power of coffee in terms of paraffin during May 1987 and January 1988 are due to the fact 
that paraffin prices were temporarily fixed and paraffin rationed. Other higher figures in 
May 1987 reflect currency reform, whose effect was already eroded by May 1988. 
Purchasing power is further eroded because the farmers are often paid the 
fixed prices late,3 sometimes up to one year later, because of mismanagement of 
crop finance, to be discussed separately in Section V below. 
Other countries have been paying the farmer a larger share of the world 
market price—up to 70 percent in Malawi, for example. In Tanzania, the 
farmer's share in the world price of a kilogram of clean coffee has been (in 
percentages) 
1966/67 1969/70 1975/76 1976/77 1984/85 
73.0 85.5 72.0 46.1 65.6 
The minimum share of 46.1 percent is still well above the Uganda maximum 
of 37.0% in Table 4. The farmer's share in the world price, therefore, needs 
increasing. The absolute value of the farmer's price also needs frequent 
adjustment to compensate him for inflation, otherwise he will have no incentive 
to increase coffee production. 
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(b) Official-smuggling dual market channels and the price elasticity of supply 
The theory behind equation (1) assumes that all coffee is marketed through 
official channels. In Uganda, however, smuggling is frequent. Although the 
exact quantities are not known, the dramatic increases in official figures of 
marketed output in 1982 in Table A.3, for example, are attributed by analysts to 
three factors: the deccumulation of stocks in response to higher producer prices; 
paying cash to the farmer on delivering the crop; and diversion of previously 
smuggled coffee into official charmels.5 
If one were to compute the price elasticity of supply al from equation (1), the 
value of this elasticity would be exaggerated because of quantities diverted from 
smuggling. This would understate the required devaluation (and increase in 
producer price) to effect a desired increase in quantity, were all the quantity to 
come from increased output alone.6 
To achieve the objectives of structural adjustment programmes, smuggling 
should be stamped out: it reduces foreign exchange earnings accruing to official 
channels. But, in practice, this has proved difficult in Uganda. 
Part of the motive for smuggling is overvaluation of the exchange rate which 
makes border prices more attractive. When this is combined with late payment 
to the farmer of a small share of the world market price, the incentive to 
smuggle is strong. For example, in 1987, the Zairean border prices for robusta 
and arabica clean were the equivalent of USh 100 and USh 140, respectively, 
while the prices were only USh 48 and USh 50 respectively, in Uganda. 
Recently the government has resorted to strictly policing the borders to stamp 
out this type of smuggling instead of adjusting the exchange rate. 
However, part of the motive for smuggling also derives from taxation policy. 
Some smuggling is done through official channels by under-invoicing coffee 
exports, loading unrecorded bags, and bribing border officials. The foreign 
exchange earned is used to smuggle back highly taxed imports, e.g. cigarettes 
and alcohol.7 Both realignment of Uganda's exchange rate with that of her 
neighbours, and more efficient tax collection at the borders, are needed to 
combat smuggling. 
(c) Efficiency of the marketing system and the movement of stocks 
The stock elasticity a3 measures the change in output with respect to variation in 
stocks throughout the marketing system. A build-up of stocks discourages 
current production and increases marketing costs: a3 has a negative sign in 
equation (1). 
Stocks appear at the three levels of the inefficient marketing system: at farm 
level; at primary processing centres for rough-hulled coffee; and at secondary 
processing and final marketing. 
Processing and marketing costs make up up to 20 percent of the international 
price per kilogram of clean coffee. Improvements in the efficiency of the system 
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would not only increase deliveries to the world market but would also reduce 
this figure leaving the balance to be passed on to the farmer. (see also note 2 to 
Table 4). 
Buying centres. Presently, coffee is bought from the farmer, either by private 
buyers or by primary co-operative societies, at a collection margin of 0.6 percent 
of the international price per kilogram of clean coffee. 
Buying by co-operatives is slow because of inadequate crop finance;8 this 
reduces marketable output from a given crop season. The farmers stock the 
coffee on the farms under poor conditions waiting to deliver it when cash is 
available. 
Private buyers pay cash on delivery, but at a discount of 2 kg (non-paid) per 
60 kg bag of kiboko. Approximately 40 percent of private buyers, who do not 
have processing facilities, stock the coffee until the next buying season: when 
the producer price is raised, they deccumulate the stocks on to the market for 
trade gains. This leakage reduces marketable output in a given crop season and 
leads to deterioration in quality. 
Processing centres: Primary processing. As illustrated in Table A.6, the 
structure of the processing industry is covered by three types of primary 
processors of rough-hulled coffee: 58 percent of the factories are privately 
owned, 26 percent are owned by primary societies and 16 percent by unions 
within the co-operative movement. 
In the current 1989/90 season the co-operatives are processing 30 percent of 
the crop, while private processors are handling 70 percent. This is a recent 
change because private processors handle crop-finance more efficiently and also 
pay the farmers cash on delivery.9 
Processing takes 6—8 percent of the international price per kilogram of clean 
coffee. There are two inefficiencies, which if rectified could reduce this figure 
and increase the farmer's share: under-utilization of capacity and low stock 
turnover. 
In 1987, Uganda had 280 factories with 509 hullers, located as in Table A.7. 
Assuming that 1,000 tons are processed by a fully utilized huller, and given that 
all factories in Table A.7 delivered 145,440 tons of processed coffee to the 
Coffee Marketing Board (CMB), the average is 520 tons per factory, or 50 
percent capacity utilization. This average gives a better picture of the reality, 
however: when columns (7) and (8) are taken into account, 70% of the factories 
delivered less than 500 tons to CMB, and 17% of the factories delivered less 
than 100 tons. 
Under-utilization of processing capacity leads to high unit costs. The factors 
leading to low capacity utilization include frequent power failures, dilapidated 
processing equipment, and licensing of new factories in areas with excess 
capacity (see note on Rakai, Bushenyi and Rukungiri districts, Table A.7). 
In some cases, excess stocking is due to dilapidated processing equipment 
which breaks down frequently. An extreme example is the Bugishu Mill in 
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Mbale (a region with few factories; see note in Table A.7). This mill stocks 
5,000 tons of semi-processed coffee for up to eight months on a wet dusty floor: 
quality deteriorates, and marketable output in the season is reduced. 
Secondary processing and marketing. Although there are four large union 
factories with secondary processing facilities (Busoga, East Mengo, Wamala, 
and West Mengo), the Coffee Marketing Board is the sole government-owned 
monopoly exporter of coffee, for which services the Board claims about 12 
percent of the international price. 
When the CMB realizes a surplus, it is turned over to government, but when it 
realizes a deficit government covers it. This gives the CMB no incentive to 
increase efficiency. 
The CMB has insufficient trucks to deliver coffee to Mombasa and Dar es 
Salaam resulting in delayed shipments; it is a poor collector of sales revenue 
from government departments which barter coffee; its quality control system is 
poor; and it often takes up to four months to pay processors from the time they 
deliver the crop.'° All the inefficiencies reduce marketable output and increase 
stocks and marketing costs. 
Summary on marketing efficiency: The marketing system is inefficient at all 
levels, especially the parastatal-like co-operatives and the CMB. The 
inefficiency reduces marketable output per season, builds up stocks at each of 
the three levels, and increases marketing costs. 
(d) The substitutabilily of coffee and bananas and the re-allocation of labour 
Bananas are the main competing crop in all three coffee-farming systems. If 
labour is tripled on a fixed acreage of land, it can raise yields from 600 kg to 
1,400 kg per hectare for robusta, and from an average of 500 kg to 750 kg per 
hectare for arabica (see data on traditional I and traditional II farming systems 
for robusta, and traditional 1 and improved III farming systems for arabica in 
Table 6). 
The higher yields come from pruning, mulching, controlling soil erosion, 
better weeding, and more careful harvesting and sorting. Assuming that 1 kg 
kiboko equals 0.52 kg of clean coffee, Table 7 shows the change in total 
marketable output from 68,390 to 152,427 tons of clean coffee. 
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Table 6 Comparison of farming systems returns 












Traditional I 600 17,000 171 
Traditional II 1,400 39,940 138 
Improved III 2,500 25,000 
Advanced IV 5,000 91,000 152 
Western arabica 
Traditional I 400 9,270 66 
Improved III 600 9,939 49c 
Eastern arabica 
Traditional I 600 32,640 187 
Improved III 900 43,714 174 
Bananas 
Traditional I 









Source: Agricultural Secretariat, Bank of Uganda, Coffee Farming Systems Development 
Report, August 1988. 
Notes: a. The farming systems are defined as follows: 
Traditional I: Semi-abandoned shamba with hardly any inputs except harvesting 
labour. A large number of coffee farmers allocate labour like this currently. 
Traditional I!: Triple labour inputs for better weeding, mulching with grass, pruning, 
better harvesting and sorting; usually when there is cash payment on delivery, at a 
higher producer price. 
Improved Ill: In addition to tripled labour, applied purchased inputs: fertilizers, 
insecticides, herbicides, etc. 
Advanced IV: In addition to tripled labour and purchased inputs, replant with higher 
yielding varieties. The yield shown is after five years when the trees mature. 
b. Despite the increase in yield, the return per hectare and per man-day are reduced 
because purchased inputs are scarce and intermittently supplied on the open 
market at high prices (usually diverted from donor agencies at fixed prices). 
c. For arabica, the existing stock is so old that it does not pay to apply purchased 
inputs, or triple labour. "Improved" entails only spraying. 
d. The application of purchased inputs and replanting occur simultaneously. At higher 
market prices, purchased inputs for coffee are most likely diverted to bananas, the 
leading competing crop for land and labour. 
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Table 7 Variation in output from re-allocation of labour to a fixed area of 190,000 ha 
robusta and 33,000 ha arabica (metric tons). 
Minimum yields (metric tons) 
Traditional farming system I Traditional farming system II 
(1) (2) (3) 
Robusta Arabica Total 
(4) (5) (6) 
Robusta Arabica Total 
Kiboko 115,020 16,500 131,520 268,380 24,750 293,130 
Clean — — 68,390 — — 152,427 
Source: Calculated from Tables A.1 and 6. 
Note: One kilogram of kiboko = 0.52 kg of clean coffee. 
The figures in Table 7 illustrate the current dilemma facing the coffee sector. 
The medium yield of 152,427 tons is about equal to the 1985 marketed output of 
152,000 tons. To keep up the current exports volume, therefore, Uganda has to 
intensify her labour inputs into coffee. 
But farm labour is not free, it has a positive opportunity cost in terms of the 
returns it can earn from the competing crop, bananas. 
The returns for bananas per hectare in the traditional farming system I are 
USh 53,670, compared to USh 39,944 per hectare of robusta coffee from 
intensified labour in fanning system II (Table 6). The returns for Arabica coffee 
are even lower. In terms of average productivity per man-day, the returns from 
bananas are USh 288 in farming system I while those from robusta in farming 
system II are only USh 138. 
The administered price of coffee, therefore, which is too low, paid late, and 
only adjusted upwards infrequently, offers little incentive to re-allocate labour 
from bananas. This is so despite the fact that the real price of bananas per 
kilogram is lower than that of coffee, and is also declining due to inflation 
(compare columns (2) and (3) with column (4) of Table A.4). The yields for 
bananas are higher, and there is an added advantage that the fanner is paid cash 
on delivery. 
Returning to Table 7, if coffee trees are neglected, marketable output can drop 
to 68,390 tons, even when the trees are not uprooted. Currently many fields are 
semi-abandoned, utilizing minimum labour for harvesting poorly weeded, 
unpruned and diseased trees growing on eroded soil. If this trend continues, 
within two years output could shrink by as much as 46 percent from that 
marketed in 1987. This is the seriously threatened state of the coffee sector in 
the short-run, which policy makers fail to realize: because coffee is a perennial 
crop, they think that high yields are perpetual. 
Tables 6 and 8 might overstate the case today, as the price of coffee may rise 
beyond that of May 1988, upon which the tables in this paper are based. 
However, when the price of coffee goes up, so does the price of bananas, and 
the prices of inputs: the crisis facing the coffee sector remains. Only when the 
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pricing system is changed to one of parity, as illustrated in Table 8, columns (3) 
and (5), can coffee compete with bananas for labour. 
Table 8. Comparison of cropping systems returns, May 1988 (USh) 
Farming systema 
Per ha (US hs '000) Perman-da y (Ushs) 
Financial Parity Economicc Parity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Robusta traditional I 13.3 35.2 40.2 218 249 
Robusta traditional Il 23.9 40.6 52.4 196 253 
Robusta improved Ill 40.3 69.3 105.7 289 441 
RobustaadvancedlV 51.6 74.6 118.2 289 458 
W. arabica traditional I 8.7 34.5 37.1 206 222 
W. arabica improved coffee 111b 10.2 34.6 68.9 195 220 
W. arabica improved all crops Ill 16.4 68.7 84.1 361 441 
E. arabica traditional I 16.6 36.6 43.1 218 257 
E. arabica improved coffee 11b 21.8 38.6 48.7 212 268 
E. arabica improved all crops III 27.8 69.8 90.1 360 464 
Source: Agricultural Secretariat, Bank of Uganda, Coffee Farming Systems Development 
Report, August. 1988. 
Notes: 
a. The farming systems —IV are defined in the text and in Note a to Table 6. 
b. It does not pay to adopt farming system IV for arabica; the resulting returns, after the 
loss of 18 months' output before the new crop comes into harvest, are marginal. 
c. The returns are calculated as the financial returns plus the valuation of labour at its 
opportunity cost in alternative employment, e.g. growing bananas in this case. 
d. The farmer pays for the inputs at market prices and receives the fixed government 
price ruling in mid-1988, without including the cost of labour. 
e. The net returns are calculated by paying for the cost of inputs at world market prices 
and selling coffee at world market price. The world market prices are converted into 
local currency at the government fixed exchange rate. But no tariffs on inputs or 
export duty on coffee, are subtracted. 
Dynamic supply responsiveness: long-run factors 
The additional 56,160 tons of marketable output cannot be produced from the 
existing fanning systems whose medium yield is close to the current marketable 
output—around 150,000 tons. The first long-run goal, therefore, is to adopt new 
technology. 
For example, to increase output up to 204,360 tons, Uganda would be 
producing 173,924 tons of clean robusta and 20,436 tons of clean arabica. This 
would require the adoption of advanced farming system IV in Table 6, to raise 
the yield to 5,000 kg/ha kiboko. 
The producer's incentive to finance investment in new technology. To adopt the 
new technology requires purchased inputs: sprays, fertilizers, herbicides, and 
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insecticides, all of which are imported and in short supply on the open market. A 
major reorganization of input supply is required, involving regular foreign 
exchange allocation and competition between private and co-operative importers 
to ensure efficiency. The government, with its slow bureaucracy, would have to 
stay out of input supply. In the long-run, local manufacture of inputs would also 
have to be considered. 
The new technology also requires extension services to develop the new high- 
yielding coffee clone, and disseminate information to the farmers regarding their 
husbandry. There is also the added opportunity cost of foregoing income up to 
18 months before the new high-yielding coffee trees can come into full harvest. 
A return to Table 6 shows that under the current pricing system, when the 
new technology is applied to bananas, the returns are USh 111,700 per hectare 
and USh 422 per man-day, while if applied to robusta, advanced farming system 
IV, the returns are only USh 91,474 per hectare and USh 152 per man-day. The 
current pricing system, therefore, offers no incentive to adopt new technology 
for coffee. Over 40 percent of the current trees are approaching the end of their 
productive life because of past neglect, and require replanting under the new 
technology. 
There is a long-run evolving crisis in the coffee sector, therefore the pricing 
system offers no incentives to improve farming practices, yet yields under 
current practices are declining. The government has proposed subsidizing inputs 
to coffee farmers. But as long as bananas have higher returns, the subsidized 
inputs are likely to be diverted to bananas. 
In the Ugandan context, the combined labour re-allocation crisis in the short- 
run, and the new technology crisis in the long-run, are serious. Cotton 
disappeared from the export sector due to poor policies; coffee might follow 
suit, but with more serious consequences as, then, the country would have no 
export base. 
IV. Increasing coffee exports: 
The policy options 
The purpose of Section IV is to estimate the exchange rate depreciation or 
export duty reduction required to realize a target increase in coffee exports, as 
follows: 
1. The percentage of devaluation required; or 
2. The percentage of reduction in export duty on coffee required to enable the 
Ugandan authorities to obtain a policy-determined target increase in foreign 
exchange earnings; 
3. To assess whether the percentage in (1) is feasible, given the fact that inputs 
into industrial production are imported, and that the supply of import 
substitutes is relatively price inelastic, in which event a large percentage 
increase in their domestic price due to devaluation can be inflationary and 
stunt import substitution; 
4. To assess further whether the percentage in (2) is feasible given that there are 
relatively few alternative sources of tax revenue. 
The analysis in Section IV assumes that price changes due to devaluation are 
immediately passed on to the farmer in cash on delivering the crop, otherwise, 
the desired change in the quantity of coffee will not be forthcoming. 
All coffee is assumed to be marketed through official channels: if some coffee 
is diverted from smuggling into official channels, this inflates the price elasticity 
of supply in Table 9, column (1), for example, and gives misleading results by 
reducing the required devaluation (see Section 111(b) above). 
The hypothetical calculations, for illustration, are presented in Table 9. 
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Table 9 The required percentage devaluation at different price elasticities 
of supply of coffee to effect an increase of 56,000 tons in coffee 
exports, 1988—1991 
The price Change in The producer The exchange Change in The price 
elasticity producer price P1 for rate R1 the exchange P i for 
of supply price clean coffee rate dR1 kiboko 
TLi 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(%) 
(5) (6) 
(1) 0.10 430 544 710 373 283 
(2) 0.50 86 201 262 75 105 
(3) 1.00 43 158 206 37 82 
(4) 1.50 29 143 187 25 74 
(5) 2.00 22 137 179 19 71 
Notes: 
Column (1) = the various values assumed for TI 
Columns (2) and (6) are in new uganda shillings. 
Column (6) is equal to column (3) times 0.52, to get the price of 1 kg of kiboko. 
The devaluation problem: No change in export duly, Option No.1 
Starting with exports of approximately 150,000 metric tons in 1987, the base 
year, the desired change in the quantity of coffee exports in order to reach the 5 
percent ICO quota and to export to non-quota markets over five years is 
estimated to be: 
(2) dQ = Q1 - Q0 = 56,160 tons, or approximately 56,000 tons 
To find the required change in producer price to increase coffee exports by 
56,000 tons (assuming no other bottlenecks), by definition: 
dQ p0 
(3) 
where TI = the price elasticity of supply of coffee, 
Po = the initial producer price of coffee, currently fixed at 60 new 
Uganda shillings per kilogram of kiboko or USh 115 per kg of 
clean coffee 
Qo = the 1987 quantity of coffee exports, i.e. 150 thousand tons. 
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The price change required is: 
(4) dP= 
Q011 
Illustrative data in this section are calculated by assuming various values of 11 
as: 0.10, 0.50, 1.00, 1.50, and 2.00. These cover the relevant range of available 
long-run price elasticities of supply in Table 1 above. 
Once dP is obtained, for each value of TI the devaluation required to effect dP 
can be estimated as: 
(5) Let the new producer price be P1 = P0 + dP 
= new USh per US$ = 100 percent as the current exchange rate. 
This R0 is associated with a producer price of USh 60 per kg of kiboko, or 
USh 115 per kg of clean coffee = P0. 
The new producer price P1 per kg will be associated (or feasible to pay) with a 
new exchange rate R1 where: 
(6) R1=R0)1 
Equation (6) gives the new exchange rate in Uganda shillings per US$. The 
percentage depreciation required to pay the farmer P1, will be: 
(7) 100 
As the quantity supplied becomes more price elastic, increasing the value of TI 
down column (1), the required rate of devaluation falls down column (5). 
The very large and painful devaluations with adverse effects on import- 
substitution and domestic inflation are within the range of TI = 0.10 to 0.50. 
Unfortunately, the discussion on the factors determining the price elasticity of 
supply in Section III suggest that Uganda's coffee supply is price inelastic, with 
11 being within the range of 0.10 to 0.5, both in the short-run and in the long-run. 
Devaluation alone, under the unchanged pricing structure and inefficient 
marketing system, is unlikely to attain the stated objectives of structural 
adjustment. 
The reduction in export duly: No devaluation, Option No. 2 
In the 1987/88 fiscal year, the export duty on coffee contributed USh 199,646 
million to recurrent revenue, i.e. 34 percent. 
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At the official exchange rate of USh 150 per US$ and assuming an 
international price of coffee of US$ 2.00 per kg, which is the rough average of 
the recent past, the coffee producer has been receiving 37 percent of the world 
market price for clean coffee. 
To raise this figure sufficiently to give a price which will induce producers to 
supply the target export volume of 56,000 tons, and assuming that transport, 
processing and marketing charges remain unchanged, the government will have 
to reduce its proportion of the international price. Table 10 illustrates the 
required reductions in the government's export duty at different price elasticities 
of supply, the resulting absolute revenue loss to government in Uganda shillings 
and the percentage of total recurrent revenue represented by this loss. 
Take row (1), for example: the price increase constitutes 181 percent of the 
world price. An extra 81 percent of the world price would have to come from 
outside coffee to subsidize the USh 544 per kg. For a country in fiscal deficit, 
this is not feasible. 
In column (5), the remaining proportion of the world price that would accrue 
to government in export duty, for rows (2, 5), is below the current 43 percent 
throughout. 
In column (7), the absolute reductions in export duty (the last four entries) are 
quite large given that in 1986/87 fiscal year, Uganda derived USh 59,493 
million from customs duty, USh 56,933 million from income tax, and 
USh 34,084 million from excise duty. The only other item next to the coffee 
export duty was the Commercial Transaction Levy which yielded close to 
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V. Other important policy 
considerations 
Comparative advantage and the domestic resource cost 
In order to adopt the improved and advanced farming systems needed to 
increase output per hectare (Table 6), new technology must be introduced. This 
technology requires imported inputs such as sprays, fertilizers, insecticides, 
pesticides, and the breeding of high-yielding clones, etc. 
An important policy consideration is whether, after importing the inputs, 
coffee still retains its comparative advantage as measured by the domestic 
resource cost indicator, or whether the production process becomes too import- 
intensive. 






C1 = the cost of the dollar earned or saved in producing the commodity; 
= the input requirements per unit of output of the commodity, or the 
technology co-efficient; 
= value added, evaluated at accounting prices at a given stage of 
fabrication; 
= the border price of the ith commodity; 
= value of imported inputs per unit of output of the commodity. 
When C1 is less than unity, there is comparative advantage in producing the 
ith commodity, i.e. the value added evaluated at international prices c.i.f. in the 
denominator of equation (8) exceeds the factor cost in the numerator, i.e. 
production is efficient. 
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When equation (8) was applied to the 1986 data, the results shown in Table 
11 were obtained: 
Table 11 Domestic resources cost ratios of the jth commodity 
Robusta coffee 0.15 0.54 
Arabica coffee 0.14 0.24 
The range of values indicates computations under different assumptions. 
According to the results, the production of both kinds of coffee was efficient at 
the 1986 costs and prices. 
It was not possible to gather 1989 data to update Table 11. However, it is 
generally believed that coffee production is efficient because Uganda has a 
favourable climate, labour is relatively cheap, and coffee fetches a high price on 
the international market. 
In terms of adopting new technology, therefore, the use of imported inputs 
would not alter coffee's comparative advantage. 
However, the assumption of cheap labour should be viewed with caution: the 
numerator in equation (8) is sensitive to the opportunity cost of labour in 
competing crops, e.g. bananas. Other things remaining equal, as the price of the 
competing crop increases, coffee loses its comparative advantage. Therefore, 
pricing policy is important for the export crop and for competing crops." 
The inflationary process and the Edwards/Fisher hypotheses 
According to Sebastian Edwards (1985), basing his analysis on data from 
Columbia where coffee is a major export, an increase in the international price 
of coffee results in an appreciation of the real exchange rate, independently of 
what the domestic monetary authorities do. 
The hypothesis works through two mechanisms: first, an increase in the price 
of coffee augments the country's foreign exchange reserves. The increase in 
reserves augments the monetary base and, unless sterilized, it leads to an 
expansion of the money supply, inflation, and real appreciation of the exchange 
rate. This is the "monetary effect". 
Second, an increase in the price of coffee, when passed on to the producers, 
raises disposable income, which leads to an increase in the demand for both 
tradeable and non-tradeable goods. 
If the price of tradeables (non-coffee) goods is given by their world price and 
the exchange rate, the increase in disposable income, "the real income effect", 
results in higher relative prices of non-tradeables, and an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. 
Our preliminary reaction is that the "real income effect" is unlikely to work in 
Uganda because only 37 percent of the change in the international price of 
coffee is passed on to the producer, and even this is often paid late. 
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On the "monetary effect" there is a related hypothesis by R. Fisher (1985), 
that a fall in the international price of coffee leads to an appreciation of the real 
effective exchange rate (and symmetrically, a rise in the price would lead to a 
depreciation). 
Fisher's transmission mechanism is through the fiscal budget: a fall in the 
international price of coffee, at a given exchange rate, lowers government's 
recurrent revenue since export duty on coffee constitutes around 50 percent of 
this revenue. To finance the budget, government borrows from the central bank, 
i.e. prints money, which results in domestic inflation and an appreciation of the 
real effective exchange rate. 
Unless one argues that "do nothing" or "no sterilization" is also a policy, the 
conclusion from the Edwards/Fisher hypotheses on the "monetary effect", 
although working through different mechanisms, is that monetary authorities are 
unable to independently control domestic inflation. This conclusion is contrary 
to the monetarist models which argue that inflation is caused by the excessive 
expansion of domestic credit, which is within the control of governments in less 
developed countries. 
The inflationary process and crop finance: a structura list view 
The Ugandan economy is characterized by a scarcity of commodities (especially 
consumer goods) and by a run-down industrial structure that cannot respond 
immediately to price incentives. Importation cannot increase the supply of goods 
because of the foreign-exchange constraint. Such an economy is prone to 
structuralist inflation due to domestic supply rigidities and a balance of 
payments constraint. 
Within this setting, coffee purchased for cash immediately pumps additional 
purchasing power into the economy, while the increase in the supply of goods 
and services on which to spend this new purchasing power is delayed until the 
foreign exchange from exporting the coffee isreceived about four months later 
and is then allocated by the Bank of Uganda to prospective importers. In the 
meantime, the new purchasing power, chasing the few goods, bids up the price 
level, and starts the inflationary process. 
To worsen the inflation, two other factors are at work: (a) part of the foreign 
exchange is used to pay international obligations and to service debt, so that 
even at the end of the delay the economy will not get enough imports to dampen 
the inflation; (b) very few local industries are capable of immediately 
responding to the increase in purchasing power because they too rely on 
imported inputs for raw materials and for rehabilitating their dilapidated plant 
and equipment. 
A number of proposals have been suggested to combat structural inflation: 
1. A system could be set up to order imports ahead of foreign exchange receipts. 
Unfortunately, this requires guarantee by the Central Bank, which is unlikely, 
given the scarcity of foreign exchange. 
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2. The procedure for foreign exchange allocation could be speeded up. 
Simultaneously, the CMB should speed up the realization of foreign 
exchange receipts. These administrative reforms would shorten the delay 
between increased purchasing power and the supply of imports. 
3. A third proposal is to pay farmers through the banking system where 
payments can be tied either to saving schemes or to production credit, or 
both. If part of the new purchasing power is saved, or used to repay loans for 
inputs supplied on credit at the beginning of the crop season, the inflationary 
process would be reduced, especially since over 40 percent of broad money 
(M2) is held as cash in the hands of the public who are chasing the few goods 
available. 
A common excuse is that there are too few banks in rural areas. However, the 
marketing co-operatives themselves could play the role of saving and credit 
institutions as they pay the farmer. 
4. The fourth, and unfortunately, most commonly used proposal, is to pay 
farmers late. This has the detrimental consequences on producer incentives 
already discussed in Section III of this paper. 
Whereas the structural problems await solutions, it is important to recognize 
that the government is unwilling to devalue since the positive effects of 
devaluation are very quickly eaten up by inflation, necessitating further 
devaluation. 
The answer lies not in fixing a disequilibrium exchange rate (no devaluation), 
but instead in deliberate measures to change supply rigidities: e.g. exports' 
diversification to rapidly increase the supply of foreign exchange, grants and 
loans to purchase imported inputs for industry, etc. These measures should form 
an integral part of structural adjustment programmes. 
The crop finance crisis and the efficiency of the marketing system 
(a) A definition of crop finance 
In Uganda, crop finance is part of working capital used to procure the crops 
from farmers and to finance stocks and processing activities in the marketing 
channel. It covers several crops: cotton, coffee, tea, tobacco and local produce 
such as maize, beans, etc. However, this paper concentrates on the coffee 
marketing system because it represents the greatest demand for crop finance. 
(b) The magnitude of crop finance 
On average, crop finance accounted for 45 percent of total commercial bank 
credit to the private sector over the years 1984—1987. The CMB is also an 
independent lender, and lately the Bank of Uganda is also directly paying some 
primary societies. This brings crop finance close to 50 percent of total bank 
credit. This magnitude of lending deprives other sectors of credit in an economy 
facing a credit squeeze because commercial banks are unable to mobilize 40 
percent of the money supply held as cash by the public outside the banking 
system. 
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(C) Explanations of The large demand for crop finance 
1. The length of the marketing channel 
(a) The farmer sells coffee to primary co-operative societies, private buyers and 
processors: these need crop finance to pay the farmer. 
(b) At the second level, crop finance is needed to finance stocks and primary 
processing by large societies with processing facilities, unions, and private 
processors. The processors sell to the CMB. 
(c) At the third level, crop finance is needed to finance secondary processing 
and stocks at the CMB until the coffee is graded and loaded for export. 
Had the buyers of the crop from the farmer been the processors and exporters, 
the funds needed to finance this shorter marketing chain would be minimized. 
2. The efficiency of the users of crop finance 
Table 12 shows the borrowers and lenders of crop finance 










1. Members of 
co-op societies 








3. Co-op societies 
without process- 
ing facilities X 
4. Co-op unions 
gradeA X X X X 
5. Co-op unions 
grades B,C and 0 X 
6. Private 
processors X X X X 
CMB X X 
Source: Agricultural Secretariat, Bank of Uganda, Coffee Farming Systems Development Report, 
August 1988. 
Note: The consortium of banks includes: Barclays Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, Bank of 
Baroda, Libyan Arab-Uganda Bank, and Grindlays Bank. UCB and the Co-operatives Bank 
are outside the consortium. 
This outlay is a result of various reforms which graded the co-operative societies 
and unions: those who are not credit worthy (e.g. co-operative societies and co- 
operative unions grades B, C and D) have their crop finance loans directly from, 
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or guaranteed by, CMB and cannot borrow from banks directly. The persistence 
of these customers in the marketing system is an anomaly since crop finance lent 
to them is not tied to any efficiency criteria such as stock turnover, capacity 
utilization of processing facilities (hullers), updated accounts, etc. Together 
these customers project a poor image of the performance of the co-operative 
sector compared to the private processors (Tables 13 and 14). 
It would have been optimal to let these categories go bankrupt, but the co- 
operative sector is run as a parastatal, tightly controlled by government which 
often appoints or approves the appointment of the secretary manager, chief 
accountants, etc., on political rather than professional grounds. 
Table 13 Comparative efficiency of unions versus private processors 
as indicated by turnover of crop finance (number of times 
per year) 
Year Private processors Unions 
1984/85 10.7 7.05 
1985/86 10.7 4.62 
1986/87 5.00 1.75 
1987/88 8.90 1.95 
Source: Agricultural Secretariat, Bank of Uganda, 1989. 
Note: A higher or more frequent turnover minimizes the demand for crop finance as stocks 
move more rapidly through the marketing chain. 
Table 14 Comparative processing efficiency 
Efficiency parameters 
Average of unions us 
structure 
ed in the price Private 
processors 
October 1987 May 1988 May 1988 
Average no. of hullers 2 2 2 
No. of shifts per huller 1 1 1 
Productiondaysperyear 180 210 210 
Production per huller 
(metric tons per day) 3 3.5 4 
Production per year 
(metrictons) 1,080 1,470 3,360 
Source: Agricultural Secretariat, Bank of Uganda. 
The same customers have less incentive to use their own funds to minimize 
the demand for crop finance because they persistently run at a loss. 
Some crop finance is diverted to other uses. A notorious example is 
Banyankole Kweterana Growers Co-operative Union which used crop finance to 
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fund a large variety of inefficiently run businesses: livestock, consumer shops, a 
Caltex petroleum station, produce purchases, etc. These businesses proved to be 
loopholes for diverting crop finance to the benefit of top management, while the 
farmers were being paid late. 
3. The CMB as monopoly exporter and as a financial intermediary 
A common complaint is that the CMB has no export drive. It practically 
confines exports to quota markets and even then takes up to four months to 
claim export receipts, a delay that is partly responsible for inflation. 
Table 3, column (3) showed that to increase foreign exchange earnings 
Uganda must sell surplus coffee, about a quarter of annual output, to non-quota 
markets: stocking this coffee leads to quality deterioration and ties up crop 
finance. 
Recently coffee is being shipped for barter where it is under priced. Bartered 
coffee is paid for by cash in local currency, but the government ministries that 
receive the bartered goods still delay in making payments to CMB: this also 
increases the demand for crop finance. 
As a financial intermediary, the CMB lending accounted for 8 percent of total 
commercial bank credit in 1987. About 70 percent of the loans went to co- 
operative societies and unions in categories 3 and 5 of Table 12, and were used 
inefficiently or diverted to non-coffee activities. The remaining 30 percent of 
loans went to the Produce Marketing Board (PMB), Lint Marketing Board 
(LMB), and the Ministry of Finance as advances in lieu of tax collection. 
According to Harvey "Essentially, a large part of the economy's financial 
intermediation has been performed by an institution wholly unequipped to do 
12 
4. The Ministry of Co-operatives and Marketing 
The Ministry is in charge of the co-operative movement within which coffee 
marketing co-operatives predominate. Co-operatives were started to organize 
smallholder farmers to cut out middlemen in processing and marketing so that 
these farmers would reap greater benefits. Co-operatives were also to be the 
main vehicle for implementing agricultural policy. The Department of Co- 
operative Development was to train skilled personnel to assist co-operators, and 
to supervise co-operative activities to ensure fairness. 
The Marketing Boards are also administered by the Ministry. The CMB and 
LMB were started to run stabilization funds in the 1950s for coffee and cotton 
by paying higher producer prices to farmers when the world price fell, and 
paying lower producer prices when the world price rose, keeping the difference 
in the stabilization fund. With the secular decline in world prices, the funds 
could not be sustained: the savings accumulated earlier were used to build 
infrastructure, e.g. the Owen Falls Dam, and to start import-substitution 
industries, e.g. Nytil Textiles. Currently both CMB and LMB are sole monopoly 
exporters, collecting foreign exchange and export duty for government, albeit 
inefficiently. 
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The PMB was started to buy local produce in surplus periods and to sell 
during scarcity to stabilize prices. More recently, the PMB has been charged 
with collecting non-traditional exports for barter. But the prices at which the 
crops are collected are too low compared to local market prices; collection is 
also inadequate and crops rot in rural areas while private marketers are 
prevented from moving the crops across district boundaries. 
In performing their intended roles, both co-operatives and marketing boards 
have been subjected to excessive government interference which has sheltered 
inefficiency and corruption. 
5. A suggested alternative marketing system 
Many proposals today argue for pumping more crop finance into the marketing 
system. For example, in the current crop season, 1988/89, USh 11 billion was 
estimated as being required for crop-finance, assuming four times the current 
turnover. As stocks pile up, the required funding is now USh 16 billion: this is 
feeding an inefficient system with more funds. 
Instead, the marketing boards should become skeletal, just to supervise 
quality and standards. They should relinquish their marketing monopoly because 
this bottles up the marketing chain. 
The co-operative movement should run on autonomous business lines: the 
inefficient co-operatives should be allowed to go bankrupt; the co-operatives 
that survive should be reorganized more efficiently to buy and process crops and 
to directly export in competition with private enterprise, which should also be 
allowed to export. Coffee exports should first fill the quota; licences should be 
auctioned for surplus coffee to be sold under aggressive competition to non- 
quota markets. The Department of Co-operative Development should be 
reduced to having a regulative function only.'3 
With trimmed co-operatives and marketing boards, the Ministry of Co- 
operatives and Marketing would become redundant and should be abolished. Its 
regulatory functions should be re-organized as the Department of Co-operatives 
and Marketing within the Ministry of Agriculture, as it used to be in the 1960s. 
This simplified institutional reform would bring marketing close to the farmers 
and enable them to have a say in the process. Marketing competition would give 
the farmers a genuine alternative to sell for cash and export, and avoid delayed 
payments. Competition would also force the marketers to move stocks, use 
retained funds to minimize the interest cost of borrowing crop-finance, and 
shorten the marketing channel. 
VI. Conclusions and suggestions 
for further research 
The objectives of structural adjustment, especially depreciation of the exchange 
rate, were to increase foreign exchange earnings by stimulating the supply of 
coffee; to redistribute income in favour of the farmer, the export producer; and 
to provide a non-inflationary source of government revenue. 
The price elasticity of supply was the major mechanism for transmission of 
incentives to the export producer in the form of a higher producer price in local 
currency, made possible by devaluation. For this incentive to work, however, the 
higher producer price must be passed on to the farmer promptly to induce him to 
increase the quantity of exports and thus foreign exchange earnings. 
A major conclusion of this paper is that the inefficient marketing system of 
the CMB and the co-operatives blocked this incentive as the farmer is paid 
late—up to one year in some cases. 
A related second conclusion is that the inefficient marketing system, by 
producing a lag between releasing cash into the economy for crop finance and 
increasing the supply of imports (both inputs and consumer goods), fueled 
inflation, which rapidly eroded the potential benefits of devaluation. 
Reorganization of crop finance and the marketing merit a separate research 
paper. 
Uganda is a one-export economy. The country depends on that one export for 
foreign exchange earnings and budgetary revenue in the form of an export duty. 
A pricing policy that extracts an excessive export duty on coffee reduces the 
proportion of the price payable to the farmer. To avoid the tax, the farmer re- 
allocates his resources away from coffee, a result contrary to the intended 
objectives of devaluation which are to raise government revenue and to 
redistribute income in favour of the farmer. 
The interaction between pricing policy, budgetary revenue, income 
distribution and devaluation, needs further research. A related subject for 
research is exports diversification, to move the economy away from a single 
export. 
An overall conclusion of this paper is that, whereas devaluation might be 
necessary to stimulate exports, by itself it is not sufficient. An optimal pricing 
policy administered through an efficient marketing system, taxation reforms, 
and exports diversification, appear equally necessary components of a 
successful adjustment programme. 











1971 229 28 251 43.7 
1972 228 29 257 42.8 
1973 206 28 234 35.8 
1974 192 30 222 29.7 
1975 191 33 224 29.7 
1976 191 33 224 29.8 
1977 191 33 224 29.8 
1978 191 33 224 30.0 
1979 190 33 224 30.0 
1980 191 33 224 34.2 
1981 191 33 224 40.1 
1982 191 33 224 41.8 
1983 191 33 224 41.9 
1984 191 33 225 42.0 
1985 191.5 33 225 41.1 
1986 191.7 33 224.7 42.6 
1987 191.7 33 224.7 - 
Sources: Bank of Uganda, Agricultural Secretariat, 1988 and authors fieldwork in Masaka, April 
1987. 
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Table A2 Estimated area, output and yield of coffee, 1986 
Robusta Arabicaa 
Area Output Implied Area Output Implied 
(ha) ('000 t) yield (ha) ('000 t) yield 
(kg/ha) (kg/ha) 
Central 
Luwero 10,620 8,601 810 
Masaka 46,112 37,360 810 
Mubende 41,296 33,450 810 
Mukono 53,082 43,012 810 
Rakai 5,764 4,670 810 
Mpigi 15,930 12,901 810 
Sub-total 172,804 139,994 810 
Western 
Bundibugyo 1,600 1,295 810 860 392 456 
Bushenyi 4,493 3,641 810 1,038 3,232 3,113b 
Hoima 1,200 972 810 — — 
Masindi 300 243 810 — — 
Mbarara 5,184 4,201 810 1,250 568 454 
Rukungiri 2,553 2,069 810 1,340 609 454 
Kabale 422 342 810 560 255 455 
Kabarole 1,104 295 810 450 205 455 
Kasese 40 32 810 1,430 650 455 
Sub-total 16,896 13,690 810 6,928 5,911 455 
Eastern 
Jinja 2,200 1,783 810 
Iganga 1,400 1,134 810 
Kamuli 1,600 1,296 810 
Kapchorwa — — 3,638 1,653 454 
Mbale — — 18,630 8,467 455 
Tororo 100 81 810 
Sub-total 5,300 4,294 810 22,268 10,120 
Northern 
Arua 150 68 453 
Nebbi 140 654 455 
Moyo 10 5 500 
Kitgum 10 5 500 
Sub-total 1,610 732 455 
Total 195,000 157,978 30,806 16,763 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture. 
Notes: a. The area for Arabica is given as 33,000 ha, while additions show it is 30,806 ha and 
output as 16,763 t instead of 15,000 t. 
b. The Arabica areas and output for Bushenyi are suspect. The reported yield of over six 
times that of other areas is not feasible. 
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1971 159 16 175 — 
1972 162 21 183 — 
1973 169 18 187 — 
1974 182 18 200 111.6 
1975 182 15 197 60.6 
1976 123 14 137 63.4 
1977 153 4 157 62.6 
1978 119 2 121 57.2 
1979 98 6 104 24.6 
1980 130 5 135 39.0 
1981 93 5 128 C 36.6 
1982 152 14 175 C 38.8 
1983 143 15 144 C 30.2 
1984 129 10 133 C 42.0 
1985 144 11 155 38.8 
1986 133 9 142 34.2 
1987 151 9 148 C — 
Sources: Bank of Uganda, Agricultural Secretariat, 1988 and author's fieldwork in Masaka District, 
April1987. 
Notes: 
a. There are no data published on actual production per year. What is marketed includes 
production, stocks, and diversion from smuggling. 
b. In column (4) data for the first entries are not available because most of the past records were 
destroyed during the war of 1979. 
c. Figures in columns (1) and (2) do not add up to those in column (3) for these years. One 
suggested source of disagreement is estimation of smuggling. Earlier estimates of smuggling 
were revised several times and synchronized. 
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Table A.4 Real average producer price in Uganda cents per kilogram 
Low income group Robusta Arabica Plantains 
cost of living coffee coffee (bananas) 
Year index,1981=100 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1967 1 88 — 52 
1965 1 88 — 56 
1969 1 106 — 52 
1970 1 109 446 122 
1971 2 60 223 43 
1972 2 60 223 46 
1973 2 60 224 34 
1974 3 42 149 57 
1975 4 63 111 50 
1976 6 42 98 -- 
1977 11 32 77 -- 
1978 48 7 21 -- 
1979 55 13 27 15 
1980 97 7 15 9 
1981 100 35 66 7 
1982 115 43 81 5 
1983 153 66 102 12 
1984 217 61 99 33 
1965 380 81 54 25 
1986 1,451 59 117 26 
1987 4,326 55 98 21 
January 1988 7,432 39 67 22 
July 1988 14,590 41 69 14 
Source: Bank of Uganda, Agricultural Secretariat, 1988 
Note: The nominal producer prices are deflated by the low income group cost of living index, 
August 1981 = 100. The real producer price of bananas rose by 200% between 1981 and 
July 1988, and was paid in cash on delivering the crop. 
The real Robusta coffee price rose by 87%, while that of Arabica rose by 3% over the same 
period. But these coffee prices were paid at least 3 months late on most occasions, and 
sometimes as late as one year. 
When the rate of inflation is high (as shown by the cost of living index in column (1) of Table 
A.4), and farmers are paid late for coffee, plantains (bananas) appear more attractive to 
grow, even if they fetch a lower nominal producer price per kg.(see column (3) Table A.5). 
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Table A.5 Norminal average annual producer prices in Uganda cents per kilogram 
Year Robusta coffee Arabica coffee Plantains 
(1) (2) (3) 
1967 88 374 52 
1968 88 380 56 
1969 106 442 52 
1970 109 446 122 
1971 119 446 86 
1972 119 446 92 
1973 119 448 68 
1974 125 448 172 
1975 250 455 200 
1976 250 586 — 
1977 350 850 — 
1978 350 1,000 — 
1979 700 1,500 825 
1980 700 1,500 910 
1981 3,500 6,500 714 
1982 5,000 9,300 626 
1983 10,000 15,500 1,892 
1984 13,000 21,000 7,170 
1985 47,000 31,000 14,300 
1986 85,000 169,200 37,100 
1987 240,000 437,000 90,900 
January 1988 290,000 500,000 166,000 
July 1988 600,000 1,000,000 209,000 
Source: Agricultural Secretariat, Bank of Uganda and Republic of Uganda, Background to the 
Budget 1988/1989 (Kampala: Ministry of Planning and Economic Development). 
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Table A.6 Number of coffee processing factories by District and by owner, 1986/87 
season 
District Number of factories Mu mber of licen ced factories 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Unions Societies Private Total Unions Societies Private Total 
13 46 69 
17 39 60 
10 24 39 
9 8 17 
5 19 28 
1 14 17 
5 8 
6 1 8 










12 36 48 
3 8 23 34 
5 22 27 
4 4 8 
6 11 17 
15 15 
3 3 
3 1 5 
4 4 9 












































20 Districts 44 73 163 280 8 47 126 181 
Source: Ministry of Co-operatives and Marketing. 
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Table A.7 Coffee processing facilities by District and by sales to CMB, season 
1986/87 
District Sales of % of total Total Total Coffee Factories Factories 
coffee to coffee sales factories hullers per delivering delivering 
CMB to CMB factory 100 metric 500 metric 
(metric tons tons 
tons) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Mukono 49,945 32 69 119 819 6 25 
Mpigi 19,436 12 60 93 381 16 38 
Masaka 13,557a 11 39 4 24 
Mubende 15,527 10 28 52 706 5 12 
Luwero 11,910 8 17 39 794 4 9 
Mbale 7,558 5 2 0 7,588b 
Rakai 6,815 4 17 32 487— 3 9 
Iganga 5,984 4 3 11 1,995 1 2 
Bushenyi 5,331 3 11 17 533— 3 8 
Mbarara 4,778 3 8 17 597 1 5 
Jinja 4,308 3 1 6 4,308 .. .. 
Hoima 3,016 2 3 8 1,005 .. I 
Rukungiri 1,921 1 8 10 274— 3 6 
Kasese 1,615 1 2 6 840 .. .. 
Kampala 1,625 1 5 11 542 .. 2 
Kamuli 784 .. 2 1 784 •. .. 
Bundibugyo 162 x 1 2 162 .. 1 
Kabarole 124 x 1 2 124 .. 1 
Kabale 20 x 1 2 20 1 1 
Nebbi 24 x 1 4 24 1 1 
Total 280 509 48 145 
Source: Ministry of Co-operatives and Marketing and Coffee Marketing Board, 1987. 
Notes: a. Deliveries to Masaka include 4,029 tonnes directly purchased by CMB but processed in 
the District. 
b. = Too few factories, relative to sales from the District. 
c. As provided by district breakdown from MCM after adding in approximately 400 tonnes 
from CMB direct buying, the resulting total being 160,000 tonnes. Exact figures for MCM 
= 4,029 tonnes, CMB buying 39 and other sources NRA, Customs, etc. 
x = Less than 0.05%. 
— = Too many factories, relative to sales from the district. 
36 RESEARCH PAPER I 
Table A.8 Revenue from improved husbandry to maximize output per hectare of 
Robusta coffee per growing season in Kibinge-Masaka, and the cost for 
each activity 
Activity Cost (New USh) 
1. Proper weeding by hoe 500 
2. Pruning 500 
3. Mulching (to reduce weeding and 
soil leaching from rains. This 
activity is labour intensive.) 5,000 
4. Fertilizer application, e.g. sulphate 
of ammonia nitrate 4,000 
5. Spraying with insecticides 4,000 
6. Harvesting, by hand-picking 500 
7. Transportation by bicycle 500 
8. Total cost of improved husbandry 
per hectare per growing season 15,000 
9. Total revenue per hectare yielding 3,000 kg, 
per season, at official price of new USh 24/kg 72,000 
10. Net revenue to the farmer per season 57,000 
Source: Author's field work, April 1987, compiled with the assistance of the Agriculture Officer in the 
area. 
Appendix B 
I. Methodology for estimating coffee supply elasticities 
The producer's optimization function. A problem in capital theory 
Given that coffee is a perennial tree crop that bears fruit for over 100 years, the producer 
regards the amount of his resources employed in coffee production as a problem in capital 
theory. He seeks to maximize the total capitalized present value of a stream of discounted 
future profits (i.e. revenue minus costs). 
1 =P.Q-WL-sI 
where P = real producer price 
Q = quantity of coffee marketed 
W = real farm wage rate 
L = quantity of labour employed 
I = gross rate of planting per year 
S = price of a hectare of land. 
The integral the farmer seeks to maximize is: 
(1) v = S 
subject to the following two constraints: 
Q = (L,X) = the production function 
= 
where V = the present value 
X = acreage under coffee in hectares 
= the rate of change of acreage with respect to time 
r = the discount rate. 
The production function meets the neo-classical criteria where: 
ax aL 
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The marginal product of each factor is positive; 
<0, —i <0 
ax2 aL2 
The marginal products decrease: that the rate of increase of coffee acreage equals 
gross planting less replanting (or abandonment), i.e. for X we are concerned with the hectares 
of mature coffee-bearing trees only. To maximize (1), subject to the two constraints, we 
maximize the following Lagrangian function as: 
V = S + - Q(L1 + (t)[X - I + oX]) dt 
V = S F(t)dt 
where F(t) = ent[P.Q - WL - sI} + Xo (t)[Q - Q X) + Xi (t)[X - 1 + 
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using (2), (t) = -e p 
substitute for?.0 (t) into equation (3): 





The marginal product of labour equals the wage rate/price ratio. 
In equation (4) (t) = s substituting for (t) and (t) into (5) we get: 
ax dt 
ert P = sc:Y + S 
ax 
(9) 
ax eriP P P 
i.e. the marginal product of land equals the implicit rental of land/price ratio. 
c = the implicit rental of land or user cost. 
The coffee producer's optimization problem in capital theory has so far been given a standard 
economic interpretation where he was seen to have maximized a constrained profit function, 
and in equilibrium, the marginal product of each factor he employed was equated to the price! 
cost ratio.1 
2. The determinants of land productivity 
To achieve a pre-determined target level of output, e.g. 56,160 tonnes, increase in the quantity 
of coffee to fill the ClO quota by the year 1991, Ugandan policy makers should be interested 
in what determines output per hectare, or the land productivity which is necessary, so as to 
maximize the quantity of coffee supplied to official channels over the given period, 
designated Q in our analysis. Let 
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(10) Q = '414 ) +(1-I<)(R) 
be the augmented production function where: 
Y = y(t) = the scale parameter denoting technological progress, 
k = the distribution parameter determining the division of income to be 
imputed to each factor of production, 
v = the degree of homogeneity of the production function, 
a = the substitution parameter between factors of production 
R = the weather parameter, assumed to be a factor augmenting and 
Hicksian "neutral" with respect to each factor of production. 
Also let a = the elasticity of substitution related to cx as 
a=-1-- 1 1+a a 
To derive the productivity per hectare equation to be estimated empirically, let 
(11) 
ax dZ ax 
where Z is set as 
z = [k(R) xa + 
= (Y) 
= (k) (-a) (R) 
ax 
From equation (11), and substituting for Z 
(12) = (Y) (-v/a) {k(R) x-U + (1-k) (R) (K) (-a) (R) 
ax 
collecting terms: 
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aQ 
(13) = Yvk (R) xa (R) 
ax 
To define output per hectare in terms of land and weather alone, return to equation 
(10), and re-writing it as 
Q -a/v = k (R)x-a + 
(1-k) (R) 
(1-k)(R) 








simplifying and equating to equation (9) 
(14) 
p ax 
From equation (14) if we arrange terms, we have: 
= Q1 + yl y- (v+a) = 
ax 
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(15) = Rkvx-a-l y(-a/v) = 
ax 
If each term in equation (15) is multiplied by a power factor of - (—1-—), we get: 
1+a 
(16) = kvR La) x yea/v) = La) 
given that a 
= 
is defined as the elasticity of substitution from which 
1 
a 
equation (16) can be rewritten as 
(17) -u 
ax 
now v V v 
= ov + 1- a 
Also 
now the right hand side of (17) becomes 
(18) kvR0Q la) 
If we take logs of equation (18) we have 
(19) 




log Y + log x] = 
now (19) can be rearranged as follows: 
let A = - a log (kvR) + log Y 
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(20) -logX=A- 
If we add log Q to both sides of equation (20) we get 
(21) log Q - log X =A log Q + 
(22) or log = A 
+ (v-va-i-i- 
log Q + 
This (22) is the output per hectare or productivity equation which Maitha used to estimate 
the elasticities of coffee supply in Kenya.2 We need data on Q and X to estimate (22) which is 
not available. Data on X in Table A.1 are simply an extrapolation. 
Notes to Appendix B 
1. This standard interpretation was followed by Maitha (1974). studying Kenyan coffee 
supply. 
2. Maitha's simplification procedure differs markedly from ours, however. This is why we 
spelt out ours in detail. His final result is log (Q/x) = A + a (1 - Wv) log Q + a log (9b) 
(Maitha, 1974). For the simplification procedure see pp. 49—5 1 and the final result is 
equation (9b) of Maitha's own procedure in his work, which we disagree with. 
Appendix C 
The problem of substitute crops 
Existing studies, including that of Maitha, assume that coffee is grown in pure stands so 
that if all suitable arable land is already planted, variation in own-producer price of 
coffee, and the existing stock not sold the previous year (Zt are the only influences 
on output per hectare. 
In Uganda, inter-planting by smaliholders who grow over 90 percent of the coffee is 
the norm, however. Coffee is inter-planted with beans, maize, bananas, etc. 
The prices of food crops are not controlled but vary with demand and supply 
conditions in the market, and with the rate of inflation. Price changes in the substitute 
crops which compete directly with coffee for the producer's indentical resources lead 
to: 
(a) Either neglect (poor husbandry) of coffee trees, and a decline in marketed output; 
or 
(b) Improvement in husbandry, thus raising coffee output (i.e. when the relative 
prices of the substitutes are below that of coffee). 
Let nt = the fraction of neglected plants, or the extent of neglect per hectare that reduces 
marketed output. 
Let bt = the extent of better husbandry in year t that is reflected in increased output. 
Let nt and bt effects be due to price changes alone, unrelated to the historical trend in 
technology improvement. 
When the real producer price declines, relative to the real market prices of substitutes, 
this leads to improved husbandry, and output for the year becomes 
(23) Q't=(l+bt)Qt 
When the real producer price declines, relative to the real market prices of substitutes, 
poor husbandry is reflected in a decline in output as 
(24) Q't=(l-nt)Qt 
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Now, since events (23) and (24) are mutually exclusive, only one of them can be 
observed in year t. 
Combining equations (23) and (24) 
Q = (1-nt) . (1+bt) Qt is the modified output in year t after taking into account the 
effects of substitute crops' market prices. 
log Q = log [(1-nt) (1+bt) J + log Qt 
log (QIX) = log [(1-nt) (1+bt)] + log Qt - log X 
Let log (Q/X) t = the log of output per hectare in year t where X itself can vary from 
year to year, while 
log (Q/X) = the actual log of output per hectare observed in a particular year 
when X itself needs not vary. But since it is the observed term that 
is relevant for policy, it can be equated to log (Q/X)t. 
Let us rewrite equation (22) as: 
(25) 
1 -nt)(1 
Let M = (1-nt) (1+bt) 
(26) Then 
log 
1 1 - Qt 
a1 a2 a3 
Equation (27), productivity per hectare, can be estimated statistically where: 
= the historical constant reflecting past historical influence and weather; 
a! = the coefficient of the variation in output per hectare due to the relative real market 
prices of substitute food crops. Data to estimate this coefficient (variation in 
coffee output alone) are derived (illustration only) in section 4 below. 
= the coefficient of the variation in output per hectare due to existing stock in year t 
of unsold coffee from previous output. 
46 RESEARCH PAPER 1 
= the coefficient of the variation in output per hectare due to the land-rental price 
ratio. Since all suitable arabic land for coffee is already planted, this coefficient 
depends on own real producer price alone, as c becomes only relevant when there 
is a decision to expand acreage, which is negligible in Uganda. The price term 
follows the expected value lag structure discussed by Nerlove (1956). 
Suppose the data on Qt for a certain coffee-growing area during the years 
198 1/1987, were as shown below (assuming that coffee is interplanted with a 
substitute crop) 









The values of nt and bt for year t can be calculated as follows: 
- Qt - Qt 
and in any given year only one of the fractions nt or bt applies since events (1-nt) and (1+b 
are mutually exclusive, i.e. better husbandry and neglect are mutually exclusive. 
We could not run equation (27). althopugh it has the advantage that only data on Qt are 
needed, the data available were on "marked output", while Qt refers to real output from the 
field. 
Appendix D 
Variation in labour productivily 
It has been argued that for an already planted shamba, short-run variations in output are due 
more to variations in labour productivity (better weeding, pruning, mulching, etc.), than to 
variation in land productivity (which only long-run inputs such as application of fertilizers 
can change). 
To estimate the change in labour productivity, the procedure is as follows: 
Q = Y{(K/R) x-a + (1-K) (R) 
Z=K(R)xa+(1 
Q = 
dL dz DL 
(-v/a-I) 
dz 
=(l - K). . y. v. z (-v/a-i 
substituting for Z 
- 1 Y . v [K(R)xa +(1 - K)R. 
(28) Therefore = (1 - K) Y.v [K(R) xa + (1 - K) R.L-aI -v/a-i 
From equation (10) 




From equation (23) 
IQ-WV 
K (R) 




= (1-K)(R) .Y.v. Hi 
+a/v 
= (1-K) (R) .v.y. y - (i-i-a/v )Qi-i-a/v = 
1-i-a/v W Q 
= (29) = (1 - K)(R) v Y - cilv + a/v 
-a (-1) -a 
= 1 - + + = 
dL P 
(30) dLa+l V a+1 
given that = is defined as the elasticity of substitution; H-a 
from which a = I - 1 
(N 
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equation (29) can be re-written as: 
(dQ) 
1 
1 - a 
(a) 
v v 
Now the right-hand side of equation (23) becomes: 
which equals 
(31) (l-K)v Q(cNv+la) .L 
= 
If we take logs of equation (28) 
(ov-i-1-a) (1-a) 
(1 - K)V R - log Q log Y + log L = -a log V 
Now equation (30) can be rearranged as follows: 
LetB = - a log(1-K) V.R + logY 
(av + 1-a) 
(33) -logL=B- 
log Q (34) 
log Q + a log lo 
(V+va+1 -a) =B+= 
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(35) B 
- 1 - log Q + 
Equation (35) is what we need to estimate the change in labour productivity. 
Like the equations derived previously, equation (35) cannot be estimated because we lack 
data on Q real output from the field, on (w) the real wage, and L the man-days of labour. 
Notes 
1. A detailed methodology to derive the productivity equation (1) from the constant 
elasticity of substitution production function, and the capital theory model, is given in 
Appendix B, Section 1. 
2. Two alternative derivations of equation (1) are given in appendix B, Sections 2 and 3. 
But these derivations cannot be empirically estimated either, until data becomes 
available. 
3. The computations assumed that the farmer is paid the fixed price in cash on delivering 
the crop. Any late pay, which is frequent, further erodes the terms of trade against the 
farmer, below that of Table 5. 
4. Tebaijuka and Mabele (1986). 
5. See also Note 3 to Table A.3 in Appendix A. 
6. See also the interpretation of the policy scenarios in Table 9 in Section 4.1 below. 
7. For example, there was a 50% increase in coffee delivered to the Coffee Marketing 
Board, CMB, in the last quarter of 1987, a period of no fresh production since harvests 
are in December/January and May/June. This was attributed to diversion from 
smuggling (Harvey, 1988). 
8. Crop Finance is discussed in Chapter V, third section. 
9. There are allegations that some managers of unions open up private processing factories 
to which they divert union crop-finance funds, in which event the efficiency of private 
processors is over-stated. 
10. The CMB is discussed further under crop-finance in Chapter V, third section. 
11. See Agricultural Secretariat (1986), The Use of the Domestic Resource Cost Method. 
12. Harvey (1988), p.24. 
13. This view is emerging from the Ministry of Agriculture. See "CMB monopoly attacked" 
New Vision Vol. 4, No. 98, Sat. 13th May 1989. 
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